Abstract. We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto candidates that they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of their most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power, and the minimal share of voters that allows to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the measure of veto power. We find tight bounds on these minimal shares for voting rules that are popular in the literature and real elections. We order these rules according to majority power and veto power. The instant-runoff rule has both the highest majority power and the highest veto power and the plurality rule has the lowest. In general, the higher majority power of a voting rule is, the higher is its veto power. The two exceptions are Black's rule and Borda rule that have a relatively low level of majority power and a high level of veto power and thus provide minority protection.
Introduction
Majority tyranny has been a buzzword for centuries and can be traced back to the ancient Greek ochlocracy. A more modern yet classical reference are the works of James Madison:
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. (Federalist 51.) In this paper we propose a simple way to quantitatively measure the robustness of a voting rule to majority tyranny or, more mildly, majority power, that is the extent to which this rule allows a majority to dictate the outcome of the elections regardless of the minorities' opinion and voting strategy.
Consider the following illustrative example presented in Table 1 . Let there be five candidates: Bernie, Donald, Hillary, John and Ted, and let the voters have one of the five rankings of the candidates, the top row gives the share of these voters in the population. Note that in this example, as also throughout the paper, the total number of voters is arbitrary.
Let us look at the voters in the last three columns in Table 1 . These voters constitute a mutual majority of 57% as they prefer the same subset of candidates (Bernie, John, and rules are comparable in terms of majority power for an arbitrary setting. The instant-runoff rule makes majority extremely powerful and has a constant quota q = 1/2 as it satisfies the mutual majority criterion. We show that the plurality with runoff makes majority less powerful, q = max{k/(k + 2), 1/2}, while the plurality rule empowers majority the least among these three rules, q = k/(k + 1).
In our example presented in Table 1 , k = 3 and thus in order to guarantee a victory to one of the preferred candidates the share of voters must be more than 60% under the plurality with runoff and more than 75% under the plurality rule. In the example, however, the share is only 57%, which is not enough to guarantee a victory for either John, Bernie, or Ted under these two voting rules.
As an additional simple illustration of the quotas, consider how these three voting rules give different incentives to nominate candidates. A leading party (or a coalition) that has a support of at least half of the voters decides whether to nominate two candidates in a general election or to run primaries and nominate a single candidate. Under the plurality with runoff, the party is safe to forgo primaries and to nominate both candidates.
3 Under the instant-runoff rule this is also the case; in fact, this party can also safely nominate more than two candidates. But under the plurality rule, unless the party has a support of at least 2/3 of voters, it has to run primaries and nominate only a single candidate.
The summary of our main results (see Theorems 1-10) is presented in Fig. 1 . We study voting rules that are popular in the literature and do not satisfy the mutual majority criterion, for each of these rules we find the minimal size of qualified mutual majority q. In Fig. 1 the voting rules are ordered in decreasing order of majority power: each arrow goes from a rule with a smaller minimal quota to a rule with a larger minimal quota.
4 Interestingly, while for small number of preferred candidates k we get only partial order as shown in Fig 1, whenever k > 4 and the total number of candidates m is arbitrary we get a complete majority power order over the rules (see Table 2 and Table 4 for details).
Our analysis allows us to ask a question that is dual to the one of majority power -about the veto power. Imagine that there is a group of voters that dislikes a group of l candidates and gives them the lowest ranks in an arbitrary order. In our example presented in Table 1 The comparison is based on the results for (q, k)-majority criterion presented in Table 4 and Table 5 , and the results for the (q, l)-veto criterion presented in Table 6 .
we have two such groups: 58% of voters dislike Hillary (l = 1), while 57% of voters dislike Hillary and Donald (l = 2). The questions is: are these groups large enough to prevent each of these l candidates from winning? Formally, a voting rule satisfies the (q, l)-veto criterion if any group of size larger than q can always veto each of these l candidates. For a given voting rule, the (q, l)-veto criterion measures its veto power: the less the quota q is, the higher is its veto power.
The (q, l)-veto criterion generalizes the majority loser criterion known in the literature. The majority loser criterion requires that when more than half of voters give the same candidate the lowest rank, then this candidate does not win. This criterion is equivalent to (q, l)-veto criterion with l = 1 and q = 1/2.
Based on the (q, l)-veto criterion, we get the same partial order as in the case of the (q, k)-majority criterion (Fig. 1) . For example, the instant-runoff rule gives the highest veto power, the plurality rule gives the lowest veto power, and the plurality with runoff rule is in-between. This is not surprising due to duality: for a given number of candidates m, a group that vetoes its l least preferred candidates in the same time guarantees that one of their m − l most preferred candidates wins.
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However, when we consider the (q, l)-veto criterion for an arbitrary total number of voters m then the order of the rules is different from the order for (q, k)-majority criterion. Whenever l > 2 the complete order based on veto power is presented in Table 2 and Table 6 .
Based on our two criteria, the instant-runoff rule is the most powerful rule both from the majority power viewpoint and the veto power viewpoint. Since the votes are transferable, a simple majority of voters that like the same candidates can ensure the win of one of these candidates. Similarly, if a simple majority dislikes the same candidates, then none of this candidates wins. Thus, the instant-runoff rule protects simple majorities. On the other extreme, the plurality rule appears to have relatively low level of majority power and veto power.
Perhaps surprisingly, the tradeoff between majority power and veto power has two exceptions. Among all voting rules, the Black's rule 6 and the Borda rule provide a balanced combination of properties: relatively low majority power and high veto power. Thus, these two rules are the best to protect minorities. In section 4 we discuss why these two rules are exceptional in our framework.
Apart from majority power per se, our two criteria and the results have another interpretation: they can shed light on how voting rules differ in their incentives for participation.
Consider an election where a mutual majority q top-ranks some k candidates. If the minimal quota of a given rule is lower than q, then minorities cannot do much. At most minorities can influence which of the top-ranked k candidates is selected, 7 but any other candidate has zero chance of winning regardless of minorities' votes. This can discourage minorities from participating. In contrast, when the minimal quota is larger than q, then minorities have a larger influence on the election and hence have stronger incentives to participate.
A similar participation argument can be deduced from the veto criterion. For instance, in a given election let the ruling party nominate l candidates (when l = 1 this candidate can be the incumbent), and let the opposition nominate their own candidates. The opposition supporters do not necessarily agree on their most preferred candidate, but they agree that the nominees of the ruling party are the worst. Then a voting rule with low veto power (i.e. high minimal quota) discourages participation of the opposition supporters, while a rule with high veto power (i.e. low minimal quota) provides stronger incentives to participate.
Observe that the two participation arguments have opposite implications. The veto power argument predicts that the rules with low quotas encourage participation of opposition supporters who dislike the same candidates, while the majority power argument suggests that such rules discourage the minorities from struggling with a mutual majority.
As an example, consider the case of the instant-runoff rule. The common opinion of the social choice literature is that the instant-runoff rule promotes participation. Indeed, when minorities face a larger group of voters with a single preferred candidate, then the instantrunoff allows the minorities to transfer their votes instead of wasting them (Tideman, 1995; Zwicker, 2016) . However, if minorities face a mutual majority with more than one preferred candidate, then the instant-runoff works in favor of this majority.
Overall, we abstain from normative judgment and cannot say which voting rule is the best based on the two criteria that we propose. These two criteria are an instrument that should be used at the discretion of a mechanism designer as such decisions always involve tradeoffs. We arrive to some of these tradeoffs when we study compatibility of the (q, k)-majority criterion (and the (q, l)-veto criterion) with other axioms; these results are presented in subsection 3.4.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the definitions of the voting rules. In section 3 we analyze our criteria for the voting rules and the relevant tradeoffs. A non-technical reader may safely skip these two sections only taking a look at Tables 4, 5, 6 and proceed to Section 4 that concludes with a discussion of the results and open questions. The proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2. Model 2.1. Voting Problem. This subsection introduces the standard voting problem and the main criteria for voting rules.
Consider a voting problem where n ≥ 1 voters I = {1, . . . , n} select one winner among m ≥ 1 candidates (alternatives) A = {a 1 , . . . , a m }. Let L(A) be the set of linear orders (complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relations) on the set of candidates A.
Each voter i ∈ I is endowed with a preference relation i ∈ L(A). (Voter i prefers a to b when a i b.)
Preference relation i corresponds to a unique ranking bijection R i : A → {1, . . . , m}, where R a i is the relative rank that voter i gives to candidate a, R a i = |{b ∈ A : b i a}| + 1, a ∈ A, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The collection of the individual preferences = ( 1 , . . . , n ) ∈ L(A) n as well as corresponding ranks (R 1 , . . . , R n ) are referred to as the preference profile. (There exist m! different linear orders and (m!) n different profiles.)
Example 1. Table 3 provides an example of a preference profile for n = 100 voters over m = 4 candidates. Here voters are assumed to be anonymous which allows us to group voters with the same individual preferences. Each column represents some group of voters, the number of voters in the group is in the top row; the candidates are listed below (starting from the most preferred candidate) according to the preference of the group. Given a preference profile we determine function h(a, b) as the number of voters that prefer candidate a over candidate b, 
It is easy to see that the set of Condorcet winners CW is either a singleton or empty. For the preference profile in Table 3 , candidate a is the Condorcet winner.
Let a positional vector of candidate a be vector n(a) = (n 1 (a), . . . , n m (a)), where n l (a) is the number of voters for whom candidate a has rank l in individual preferences,
The definition implies that each positional vector has nonnegative elements, n l (a) ≥ 0 for each l, and the sum of elements is equal to the number of voters
Candidate a is called a majority winner, if n 1 (a) > n/2. Similarly, candidate a is called a majority loser, if n m (a) > n/2.
A collection of positional vectors for all candidates is called a positional matrix n( ) = (n(a 1 ), . . . , n(a m )). Table 3 provides the positional matrix for the profile in Example 1. A mapping C(B, ) that to each nonempty subset B ⊆ A and each preference profile gives a choice set is called a voting rule (or social choice rule),
where C(B, ) ⊆ B for any B; and C(B, ) = C(B, ), whenever preference profiles , coincide on B.
A rule is called universal if C(B, ) = ∅ for any nonempty B and any profile . For instance, Condorcet rule CW (B, ) is not universal.
Let us define the criteria that are critical for the results of the paper and the voting rules considered below.
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Majority criterion. For each preference profile, if some candidate a is top-ranked by more than half of voters (n 1 (a) > n/2), then the choice set coincides with this candidate.
Mutual majority criterion. 11 For each preference profile, if more than half of voters give to some k candidates (B = {b 1 , . . . , b k }, 1 ≤ k < m) top k ranks in an arbitrary order, then the choice set is included in B.
Majority loser criterion. 12 For each preference profile, if some candidate a is bottomranked by more than half of voters (n m (a) > n/2), then the choice set excludes this candidate.
For any fixed quota q ∈ (0, 1) and any fixed number of preferred candidates k among the total of m candidates, we define the next criteria.
9 Any social choice rule is a voting rule. There exist voting rules that are not social choice rules; for example, approval voting, preference approval voting (Brams, 2009) , and majority judgement (Balinski and Laraki, 2011) . 10 The "extremely desirable" criteria of universality, non imposition, anonymity, neutrality, unanimity are satisfied by all voting rules considered in this paper (see, e.g. Fischer et al., 2016; Taylor, 2005; Tideman, 2006; Zwicker, 2016) . 11 Mutual majority criterion is implied by a more general axiom for multi-winner voting called DroopProportionality for Solid Coalitions (Woodall, 1997) . 12 For a voting rule, the majority criterion is satisfied if and only if the absolute majority winner paradox never occurs. For a voting rule, the majority loser criterion is satisfied if and only if the absolute majority loser paradox never occurs (see e.g. Felsenthal and Nurmi, 2018; Diss et al., 2018) .
(q, k, m)-majority criterion.
13 For each preference profile with the total of m candidates, if a share of voters higher than q gives to some k candidates (B = {b 1 , . . . , b k }, 1 ≤ k < m) top k ranks in an arbitrary order, then the choice set is included in B.
For given q, k, we say that a rule satisfies (q, k)-majority criterion, if it satisfies (q, k, m)-majority criterion for each m.
For a given q, we say that a rule satisfies q-mutual majority criterion, if it satisfies (q, k)-majority criterion for each k.
For universal voting rules, it is also apparent from the definitions that mutual majority criterion implies the majority criterion; for any k, m and any q ≥ q, (q, k, m)-majority criterion implies (q , k, m)-majority criterion; the majority criterion is equivalent to (1/2, 1)-majority criterion; mutual majority criterion is equivalent to (1/2, k)-majority criterion with arbitrary k; the majority loser criterion is equivalent to (1/2, m − 1, m)-majority criterion. 14 2.2. Voting Rules. This subsection presents the definitions of the voting rules that satisfy the majority criterion but do not satisfy the mutual majority criterion. Also we consider monotonic scoring rules that generally do not satisfy the majority criterion.
In the plurality voting rule the candidate that receives the most of top positions is declared to be the winner,
The plurality with runoff (RV) voting rule proceeds in two rounds: first the two candidates with the most of top positions are determined, then the winner is chosen between the two using simple majority rule.
According to Simpson's rule (1969) , aka maximin voting rule, see also Young (1977) , each candidate receives a score equal to the minimal number of votes that this candidate gets compared to any other candidate,
and the winner is the candidate with the highest score. By Young's rule (1977), see Caragiannis et al. (2016) , the winner is the candidate that needs the least number of voters to be removed for this candidate to become a Condorcet winner.
According to Condorcet least-reversal rule (CLR) (the simplified Dodgson's rule, see e.g. Tideman, 2006 ) the winner is, informally, the candidate a ∈ A that needs the least number of reversals in pairwise comparisons in order to become a Condorcet winner. Formally, the winner d minimizes the following sum of losing margins compared to each other candidate c:
13 (q, k, m)-majority criterion is even more general than the concept q-PSC formalized by Aziz and Lee (2017) if the latter is applied to single-winner elections. The weak mutual majority criterion defined by Kondratev (2018) turns as a particular case of q = k/(k + 1). Also, q-majority decisiveness proposed by Baharad and Nitzan (2002) is a particular case of k = 1. A somewhat similar approach but for q-Condorcet consistency is developed by Baharad and Nitzan (2003) , Courtin et al. (2015) , and Mahajne and Volij (2018) . All these approaches are based on worst case analysis. 14 Also one can see that unanimity criterion is equivalent to (1 − ε, 1)-majority criterion with infinitely small ε > 0.
The classic Dodgson's winner (1876), see also Caragiannis et al. (2016) and McLean and Urken (1995) , is determined as the candidate that needs the least upgrades by one position in individual preferences that makes him a Condorcet winner. To satisfy homogeneity 15 property such upgrades are allowed to perform for non integer amount of voters.
By Borda rule (1781), see also McLean and Urken (1995) , the first best candidate in an individual preference gets m − 1 points, the second best candidate gets m − 2, . . . , the last gets 0 points.
The total Borda score can be calculated using positional vector n(a) as follows:
The candidate with the highest total score wins. The score can also be calculated using the tournament matrix:
Black's rule (1958) selects a Condorcet winner. If a Condorcet winner does not exist, then the candidate with the highest Borda score (3) is selected.
In a non-generalized scoring rule each of m candidates is assigned a score from s 1 , . . . , s m for a corresponding position in a voter's individual preference and then the scores are summed up over all voters.
16 In the paper we consider monotonic scoring rules in which s 1 > s m and s 1 ≥ s 2 ≥ . . . ≥ s m . The plurality rule and Borda rule are monotonic scoring rules with the scores s 1 = 1, s 2 = . . . = s m = 0 and s 1 = m−1, s 2 = m−2, . . . s m = 0, respectively.
Inverse plurality rule (aka anti-plurality rule or negative voting) is a monotonic scoring rule with the scores s 1 = . . . = s m−1 = 1, s m = 0.
If the difference in scores is positive and non decreasing from position m to position 1, that is, 0 < s m−1 − s m ≤ s m−2 − s m−1 ≤ . . . ≤ s 1 − s 2 , then a rule will be called a convex scoring rule. For instance, Borda rule is a convex scoring rule.
Our last rule is based on truncated Borda scores defined as follows. For some positional vector n(a) and some real number t ∈ (0, +∞) the truncated Borda score (Fishburn, 1974) 
where formally put n i (a) = 0 for i > m. The definition implies that B m−1 (a) = Bo(a). Now we can define the convex median voting rule (CM) (Kondratev, 2018) . If n 1 (a) > n/2 for some candidate a, then this candidate is the winner. Otherwise, for each candidate a define the score of convex median using the following formula:
and the winner is the candidate with the lowest value of the convex median. We complete this section with one more desirable criterion.
Second order positional dominance (2-PD) (Stein et al., 1994) . Whenever candidate a obtains a higher score than candidate b for all convex scoring rules, then candidate b is not included in the choice set.
Results

3.1.
Majority-Consistent Voting Rules. This subsection considers the voting rules that satisfy the majority criterion (thus, they satisfy (q, k)-majority criterion with k = 1 and any q ≥ 1/2) but do not satisfy the mutual majority criterion.
17 In case of only two candidates each rule satisfying the majority criterion coincides with the simple majority rule where the winner is the candidate that gets at least half of votes.
18 In what follows we consider the case of m > 2 candidates.
For the voting rules, below we find necessary and sufficient conditions under which the (q, k, m)-majority criterion is satisfied. First we determine the tight bounds for the plurality rule, the Simpson's rule, the Young's rule and the Condorcet least-reversal rule. Few peculiarities can be observed regarding the results above. For the plurality rule, Simpson's rule, Young's rule, and Condorcet least-reversal rule, the minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q(k, m) depends on the number of k preferred candidates but does not depend on the total number of m candidates. Theorem 4 shows that Condorcet leastreversal rule is, perhaps surprisingly, very close to satisfying the mutual majority criterion as it satisfies 5/8-mutual majority criterion. On the other extreme, the plurality rule gives the highest nontrivial minimal quota for a given k > 1 among all studied voting rules.
Interestingly, Simpson's rule and Young's rule have the same minimal quota q for each number of preferred candidates k and each total number of candidates m, this is the only such coincidence among all rules that we consider.
Next we determine the tight bounds for the plurality with runoff and the Black's rule. Theorem 6 actually finds the tight bound of quota for Borda rule. In particular case k = 1, this quota equals q = (m − 1)/m, and also was calculated by Baharad and Nitzan (2002) , Nitzan (2009) . and also the equation (4) 4k(m − k − 1)q 2 + (5k
Let us briefly motivate the results for the convex median voting rule. Borda rule satisfies second order positional dominance (2-PD) but it fails the majority criterion. The convex median voting rule was proposed by Kondratev (2018) as a rule that satisfies both 2-PD and the majority criterion. Theorem 7 shows that this rule is much closer to satisfying the stronger criterion of mutual majority as it satisfies 3/4-mutual majority criterion. For Dodgson's rule, below we find sufficient conditions. Necessary and sufficient conditions remain as an open question.
Theorem 8. For m > k ≥ 1, Dodgson's rule (with non integer amount of upgrades) satisfies (q, k, m)-majority criterion with q ≥ k/(k + 1); the rule fails the criterion with q < (5k − 2)/(8k) in case of even k ≥ 2, and q < (5k 2 − 2k + 1)/(8k 2 ) in case of odd k ≥ 1.
The summary of the results from this subsection (Theorems 1-7) is presented in Fig. 1 . We can only partially order the voting rules with respect to majority power when the total number of candidates m and the number of preferred candidates k are not specified. The minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q(k, m) weakly increases along the arrows.
Using the (q, k)-majority criterion we get a complete order of the voting rules, as is shown in Table 4 . The voting rules are ordered based on the quota q from those with the highest majority power to those with the lowest whenever the number of preferred candidates k > 4. When k = 1, the quota for majority-consistent rules equals 0.5. (The Borda rule does not satisfy the majority criterion and has quota 1.) As k increases and the mutual majority's preferences over the preferred candidates might become more diverse, the minimal quota q also weakly increases. The rate of this increase varies among the rules and for small k ∈ {2, 3, 4} the order of the rules varies as well. 1.000 Black's 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Borda 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Inverse plurality 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.000 1.000
The following notations are used: CLR -Condorcet least reversal rule, RV -plurality with runoff rule. The voting rules are ordered according to the minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q for k > 4. For majority-consistent rules q = 1/2 whenever k = 1. The instant-runoff rule satisfies the mutual majority criterion and therefore q = 1/2 for each k.
Theorem 9. For each m > k ≥ 1, a monotonic scoring rule satisfies (q, k, m)-majority criterion if and only if the quota q satisfies the next inequality
For each m > 1, a monotonic scoring rule satisfies the majority loser criterion 20 if and only if the next inequality holds
In particular case k = 1, the inequality (5) is
and also was calculated by Nitzan (2002), Nitzan (2009) .
In particular case k = 1 and q = 1/2, we receive the inequality s m ≥ s 2 . Thus, for each m > 1, a monotonic scoring rule satisfies the majority criterion if and only if this rule is equivalent to the plurality rule (s 1 > s 2 = . . . = s m ). This fact was also established by Lepelley (1992) , Sanver (2002) .
In particular case m = 3, the inequality (6) was established e.g. by Diss et al. (2018) . For the inverse plurality rule (s 1 = . . . = s m−1 = 1, s m = 0), Theorem 9 directly implies the next statement.
20 Equivalently, the absolute majority loser paradox never occurs. 21 Equivalently, q-majority consistency (aka q-majority decisiveness) is satisfied. Table 5 . Minimal quota q such that (q, k, m)-majority criterion is satisfied m = 3 m = 3 m = 4 m = 4 m = 4 Voting rule k = 1 k = 2 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 Instant-runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 Condorcet least reversal 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.556
Convex median 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.593 0.500 Plurality with runoff 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 Simpson's 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.667 Young's 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.667 Plurality 0.500 0.667 0.500 0.667 0.750 Black's 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.625 0.500 Borda 0.667 0.500 0.750 0.625 0.500 Inverse plurality 1.000 0.333 1.000 1.000 0.250
The voting rules are ordered as in Table 4 . We highlight the instances of quotas that are different from 0.5.
Theorem 10. For each m − 1 > k ≥ 1 and for each q < 1, the inverse plurality rule fails (q, k, m)-majority criterion; for each m − 1 = k ≥ 1, the rule satisfies (q, k, m)-majority criterion if and only if q ≥ 1/m.
Note that for the inverse plurality rule the minimal quota q may be below one half. This occurs whenever the number of preferred candidates k equals the total number of candidates m minus one, which is the same as saying that one candidate is vetoed by the mutual majority. We present the analysis of the veto power in the next subsection.
Theorem 9 extends the class of voting rules that we can compare using the minimal quota q, yet this comparison should be made for specific number of candidates m (as for most monotonic scoring rules (q, k)-majority criterion gives the same tight quota q = 1). Thus, we have to use the (q, k, m)-majority criterion. Table 5 presents this comparison for majorityconsistent voting rules that we considered earlier, the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule when the total number of candidates m = 3, 4.
We see that for all studied voting rules, when m, k are small, most of the values of the minimal quota q is equal to 0.5. Interestingly, whenever m ≤ 4 (Table 5) or k ≤ 2 (Table 4) , the plurality with runoff rule has exactly the same minimal quotas q = 0.5 as the instantrunoff rule.
We can illustrate the results for the Borda rule and the plurality rule using the Example 1 presented in Table 3 . Candidates a and b are the two (k = 2) preferred candidates among the total of four (m = 4) candidates, supported by the mutual majority of 57% voters. This value is below the minimal quota for the Borda rule (q = 0.625) and the plurality rule (q = 0.667), and thus these rules might not select a or b. In our example both rules select candidate c.
3.3. Veto Power. The criteria that we presented above for majority power also allow us to state a somewhat opposite research question, that is of veto power. Specifically: how large should a group of voters be in order to be able to block its l least preferred candidates? 1.000 Inverse plurality 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Plurality with runoff 0.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Simpson's 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Young's 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Plurality 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The voting rules are ordered according to the minimal size of the qualified mutual majority q for l > 2. For majority loser-consistent rules q ≤ 1/2 whenever l = 1. The instant-runoff rule satisfies the mutual majority criterion and therefore q = 1/2 for each l.
This problem is dual to the problem of finding the minimal quota for the mutual majority that has k = m − l preferred candidates. Thus we can immediately compute the minimal quota of such group as in (q, m − l, m)-majority criterion.
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Let us define the veto criterion formally. For a given quota q and a given number of the least preferred candidates l, we say that a rule satisfies (q, l)-veto criterion, if it satisfies the (q, m − l, m)-majority criterion for each m.
Overall, when we compare the rules based on the veto criterion from the most vetopreserving to the least, we get a partial order (the same as for (q, k, m)-majority criterion, see Fig. 1 ). However, when we compare the rules based on (q, l)-veto criterion, that is for an arbitrary total number of candidates m, we get a complete order for l > 2 as shown in Table 6 . In case l = 1 this order is different and very peculiar, we discuss it below.
When l = 1, our results highlight the inverse plurality rule as the rule that respects the minorities the most: its minimal quota is q = 1/m. The previous literature has arrived to the same conclusion by comparing only monotonic scoring rules Nitzan, 2005, 2007a,b) . We extend the comparison to non-scoring rules and confirm this consensus when l = 1.
However, when l > 1, we arrive to the opposite conclusion. In this case the minimal quota q for inverse plurality rule jumps to 1 and thus no group of voters (except the entire set) can veto l > 1 candidates (see Table 5 where k = m − l, Table 6 , and Theorem 10). The reason is that unless the group coordinates, some of the l candidates may receive very small number of lowest positions.
Comparing the results for the veto criterion in Table 6 with the quotas for the (q, k)-majority criterion in Table 4 we see that voting rules differ in their power for the most preferred candidates and the least preferred candidates. Overall the order of rules remains the same except for the triple of the Black's rule, the Borda rule, and the inverse plurality rule. These rules perform better when a group of voters needs to veto a candidate, rather than to make him win.
3.4. Other Criteria and Tradeoffs. In this subsection, we discuss the tradeoffs between the (q, k)-majority criterion, the (q, l)-veto criterion and other criteria from the literature.
For the general classes of voting rules, satisfying the mutual majority criterion (aka (1/2, k)-majority criterion with arbitrary k) is not a concern. For instance, among Condorcetconsistent rules we can highlight the ranked pairs rule introduced by Tideman (1987) and Schulze's rule (2011) , among iterated positional rules -the instant-runoff rule, among positional rules -the median voting rule (Bassett and Persky, 1999) , the Bucklin's method (see e.g. Tideman, 2006) , and the majoritarian compromise (Sertel and Yılmaz, 1999) .
In contrast, for monotonic scoring rules (q, k)-majority criterion is often out of reach. There is no scoring rule that for arbitrary k satisfies (1/2, k)-majority criterion. However, for each fixed k, the scoring rule with the scores s 1 = . . . = s k = 1, s k+1 = . . . = s m = 0 satisfies (1/2, k)-majority criterion. Below we consider the tradeoffs for scoring rules in more detail.
For a given voting rule, we can see the tradeoff between majority power (including the majority criterion, and the mutual majority criterion), veto power (including the majority loser criterion), and other criteria from its axiomatic characterizations. Baharad and Nitzan (2005) prove that the inverse plurality rule is the only non-generalized scoring rule that satisfies the minimal veto criterion.
23 Though their minimal veto criterion involves strategic candidates and is different from ours, it shows that the quota q = 1/m (for the case of l = 1 least preferred candidates) characterizes the inverse plurality rule. This implies that the (q, k)-majority criterion is never satisfied (for each fixed k, the minimal quota q for the inverse plurality rule equals 1).
The plurality rule is the only non-generalized scoring rule that satisfies the majority criterion (Lepelley, 1992; Sanver, 2002) . This implies that if a non-generalized scoring rule satisfies the (1/2, 1)-majority criterion for k = 1, then for any given k the minimal quota is necessarily q = k/(k + 1).
Sanver (2002), Woeginger (2003) prove that a generalized scoring rule cannot simultaneously satisfy the majority criterion and the majority loser criterion. This tradeoff can be illustrated by the plurality rule, the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule. While the plurality rule satisfies the majority criterion, it fails the majority loser criterion. In contrast, Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule satisfy the majority loser criterion and hence fail the majority criterion.
Other impossibility results involving the majority criterion and the majority loser criterion can be found in our previous paper (Kondratev, 2018, Theorem 4.2) . Among 37 different criteria only the second order positional dominance (2-PD) resists to the 1/2-mutual majority criterion. Specifically, there is no rule that satisfies both 2-PD and 1/2-mutual majority criteria. 23 The fundamental characterization of the class of generalized and non-generalized scoring rules was introduced by Smith (1973) and Young (1975) . They use the criteria of universality, anonimity, neutrality, and consistency (aka reinforcement) for the generalized scoring rules, and additionally the continuity (aka Archimedean) criterion for the non-generalized scoring rules. Usually, characterizations of specific scoring rules involve this powerful result; see e.g. Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) for a review and Richelson (1978) and Ching (1996) for the case of plurality rule.
This impossibility is easy to see from the preference profile in Table 3 . Here, candidates a and b are supported by a mutual majority of 57% of voters. However, candidate c obtains a higher score than candidates a, b for all convex scoring rules, i.e., c second order positionally dominates a, b.
We can generalize the latter result from the 1/2-mutual majority criterion to the (q, k)-majority criterion for any given k. The next Theorem establishes the tradeoff between 2-PD and (q, k)-majority criterion.
Theorem 11. 1) If k ≥ 1 and q < 2k/(3k + 1), then there is no rule that satisfies the second order positional dominance and (q, k)-majority criteria; 2) There exists a rule that satisfies both criteria for each k ≥ 1 and each q ≥ 2k/(3k + 1).
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This theorem also shows that 2-PD and q-mutual majority criteria are compatible if and only if q ≥ 2/3.
Concluding Remarks
We introduced and studied the quantitative properties which we call the (q, k)-majority criterion and the (q, l)-veto criterion. These criteria allow us to study how decisive each voting rule is, that is to what extent a voting rule respects majority power and/or veto power.
Our criterion forms a partial order over the studied voting rules (see Fig. 1 ). In general, the rule with higher majority power also has a higher veto power.
The instant-runoff rule has the highest majority power and veto power, the plurality rule appears to have relatively low level of majority power and veto power (see Table 4 and Table 6 ). Somewhat surprisingly, the inverse plurality rule (aka the anti-plurality rule or negative voting) also gives low veto power while previously it has been assumed to give minorities the highest veto power Nitzan, 2005, 2007a,b) . This discrepancy comes from the fact that previously veto power was assumed to be used against only one least preferred candidate, l = 1. In this case our results agree with the literature, while when l > 1 we show that the inverse plurality rule may require the entire set of voters, q = 1, to veto these l candidates (see Theorem 10 and Table 6 ). Finding a voting rule that consistently gives the highest veto power to minorities is an open question. Another question here is whether this peculiarity of the inverse plurality rule also occurs in the strategic framework of Nitzan (2002, 2007b) .
For each specific setting (fixed number of preferred candidates and the total number of candidates) the partial order becomes complete. Surprisingly, in the complete orders the direct relation between the majority power and the veto power disappears. Specifically, the Borda rule and the Black's rule have lower majority power than the plurality rule (see Table 4 ), but in the same time they have higher veto power than the plurality with runoff (see Table 6 ). This is possible since the Black's rule and the Borda rule are not comparable with the plurality rule and the plurality with runoff in the partial order (see Fig. 1 ). Thus, the Borda rule and the Black's rule are, perhaps, the best rules to protect minorities.
Among the two rules the Black's rule seems to have more distinguished set of properties. From the theoretical point of view, the first stage of Black's rule, the Condorcet rule (aka pairwise majority rule), works well because on a large domain it is strategy-proof (Campbell and Kelly, 2003) and satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2008; Miller, 2018) . Statistically, Black's rule is much less manipulable than Borda rule (Aleskerov and Kurbanov, 1999; Aleskerov et al., 2012; Green-Armytage et al., 2016) . In real elections, however, both rules mostly select the same candidate despite the fact that a Condorcet winner usually exists (Feld and Grofman, 1992) .
We find that (q, k)-majority criterion is compatible with various standard desirable properties for voting rules. The only exception is the second-order positional dominance criterion. For each q < 2k/(3k + 1), Theorem 11 shows that each rule that satisfies the second-order positional dominance criterion does not satisfy (q, k)-majority criterion.
One specific open question arises from the incomplete result regarding Dodgson's rule: in contrast to other results, Theorem 8 does not specify the tight bound on the quota. The value of the tight bound seems to be a hard question, as Dodgson's rule is known to be difficult to work with (Bartholdi et al., 1989; Caragiannis et al., 2016; Hemaspaandra et al., 1997) . It is not easy to check whether the profile in Table 7 (which we use for the proofs in the Appendix) gives the worst case for each candidate in the group of mutually supported candidates and at the same time the best case for some other candidate outside the group.
Our criteria do not provide a comparison for voting rules that satisfy the mutual majority criterion: all such rules have the same high level of majority power and veto power. In fact, all our results for the instant-runoff rule hold for an arbitrary voting rule that satisfies the mutual majority criterion. Designing a proper quantitative criteria that would distinguish these rules is an open question.
Another question is generalizing our criteria of majority power and veto power to the framework of multi-winner elections, as for instance done for proportionality degree in Lackner and Skowron (2018) and Skowron (2018) .
A more general open question is the analysis of majority power and veto power in practicallyrelevant scenarios. In this paper the main results are based on the worst-case analysis as it allows to provide precise estimates for any total number of candidates. Future research can make use of more realistic scenarios inspired by theories of individual decision-making, empirical results, and experiments on voting. A particularly developed approach is the one that measures statistical properties of voting rules, such as Condorcet efficiency (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2017) , majority winner and majority loser efficiency (Diss et al., 2018) , manipulability (Aleskerov and Kurbanov, 1999; Aleskerov et al., 2012; Green-Armytage et al., 2016) and others.
Finally, in studying majority power and veto power one is not restricted to single-winner elections where a representative or a ruler is selected. Alternative ways to protect minorities range from using two periods of voting (Fahrenberger and Gersbach, 2010) , allowing storable votes in multi-issue elections (Casella, 2005) , direct democracy, participatory budgeting (Cabannes, 2004) , and multi-winner elections.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than nk/(k + 1) voters give candidates from some subset B A (m > |B| = k ≥ 1) top k positions. Then all together candidates in B receive strictly more than nk/(k + 1) top positions, while candidates from A \ B all together receive strictly less than n/(k + 1) top positions. Therefore, at least one of the candidates in B receives strictly more than n/(k + 1) top positions, and each candidate from A \ B receives strictly less than n/(k + 1) top positions. Therefore, the plurality rule can only select a candidate from set B.
For any smaller quota q < k/(k + 1) we can always find the following counterexample. Let the total number of voters be n = k + 1 and let k voters give candidates from set B top k positions such that each of these candidates gets the top position exactly once. Let the other voter give the top position to some other candidate a / ∈ B. Then the plurality rule selects all candidates from the set B ∪ a.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Let m ≥ 3, and more than n(k − 1)/k voters top-rank k ≥ 2 candidates, denote this subset of candidates as B = {b 1 , . . . , b k }. It is easy to see that each candidate in A \ B gets less than n/k of Simpson's scores (a candidate from A \ B gets the highest score when it is top-ranked by all voters that do not top-rank B).
Denote the number of the first positions of some candidate b ∈ B among all other candidates in B as n 1 (b, B):
Since the total number of first positions is fixed n 1 (b 1 , B) + . . . + n 1 (b k , B) = n, there is a candidate b ∈ B with the number of top positions weakly higher than the average:
Hence, there is a candidate that receives not less than n/k of scores, and each candidate from A \ B gets less than n/k scores and cannot be the winner.
To see that the bound q = (k − 1)/k is tight consider the following counterexample in Table 7 : each candidate b ∈ B receives exactly qn/k first positions, qn/k second positions and so on from the qualified mutual majority of qn voters, while all voters outside of the qualified mutual majority top-rank some other candidate a 1 and also prefer all candidates in A \ B over candidates in B.
For each k>1 we can set n=k 2 and q=(k−1)/k. Then set B is supported by n(k−1)/k voters, while each candidate from the set B ∪ a 1 gets the same Simpson's score.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than n(k − 1)/k voters top-rank k ≥ 2 candidates, denote this subset of candidates as B = {b 1 , . . . , b k }. We consider the next two cases separately.
Case 1.
[n/k] = n/k, where [ ] is the integer part. In this case, not more than [n/k] − 1 voters give the first positions to the candidates from the set A \ B. For each candidate from A \ B to make him a Condorcet winner, we need to remove more than n − 2([n/k] − 1) = n − 2[n/k] + 2 voters.
Consider some candidate b ∈ B with a higher than average number of top positions n 1 (b, B) ≥ n/k = [n/k] (as defined in equation (7)). For b to win, at most n − 2[n/k] + 1 voters have to be removed.
Case 2.
[n/k] < n/k, where [ ] is the integer part. . . .
The qualified mutual majority of qn voters give exactly qn/k first, second and so on positions to each candidate b i ∈ B, all preferences over remaining alternatives A \ B are the same. The other (1 − q)n voters prefer each candidate in A \ B over each candidate in B, and have identical to the former qn voters relative ordering of candidates within these two sets B and A \ B. This type of cyclical preferences over B is known as a Condorcet k-tuple. 
In this case, not more than [n/k] voters give the first positions to the candidates from the set A \ B. For each candidate from A \ B to make him a Condorcet winner, we need to remove more than n − 2[n/k] voters.
Consider some candidate b ∈ B with a higher than average number of top positions n 1 (b, B) ≥ n/k > [n/k] (as defined in equation (7)). Thus, n 1 (b, B) ≥ [n/k] + 1. For b to win, at most n − 2([n/k] + 1) + 1 = n − 2[n/k] − 1 voters have to be removed.
The example from Table 7 shows that the bound (k − 1)/k is tight.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Again we use the preference profile in Table 7 . Let's first show that it is the worst possible profile for each candidate b ∈ B to win by the Condorcet least-reversal rule, i.e. it has the maximum minimal score p CLR b among all candidates b ∈ B. To maximize the minimal score p CLR for candidates in B we can maximize the scores (1) for the subset B separately: c∈B\b . This is true, because the other part c∈A\B is zero whenever q ≥ 1/2.
According to (Saari, 2000, Proposition 5) , each tournament matrix with k candidates has unique representation as the sum of its transitive matrix and its Condorcet k-tuple matrix (Table 8) . Thus, the maximal element of the transitive matrix gets not more total scores p CLR than in the k-tuple matrix only. Hence, the profile in Table 7 qualifies as the worst case.
Next we find the bound for the profile in Table 7 . Each candidate a ∈ A \ B gets at least p CLR a ≥ nk(2q − 1)/2 points. Candidate b 1 gets n/k, 2n/k, . . . , (k − 1)n/k pairwise majority wins against candidates b k , . . . , b 2 correspondingly. For even k the score for each b ∈ B is p
2 /(8k). Setting these scores equal to the score p CLR a 1 = nk(2q − 1)/2 received by a 1 we get the tight bounds.
Proof of Theorem 5.
In case k = m − 1, and q = 1/2, in the second round there is at least one candidate from the supported k candidates, and this candidate wins. For any smaller quota q < 1/2 we can always construct a counterexample where a majority winner does not belong to the set of k candidates. This case also includes the case m = 3, k = 2.
Let m > 3, and let more than nk/(k + 2) voters give candidates from some subset B A (m − 1 > |B| = k > 1) top k positions. Then all together candidates in B receive strictly more than nk/(k + 2) top positions, while candidates from A \ B all together receive strictly less than 2n/(k + 2) top positions. Therefore, at least one of the candidates in B and at most one of the candidates in A \ B receive strictly more than n/(k + 2) of top positions. Thus, in the second round there is at least one candidate from set B. Even if the second candidate is from A \ B, this second candidate loses to the candidate from B by simple majority rule. Hence, the winner is from B.
For any smaller quota q < k/(k + 2) we can always find the following counterexample. Let the total number of voters be n = (k + 2)n + 2 and let kn voters give k candidates from set B top k positions such that each candidate in B gets the top position exactly n times. Consider the other 2 · (n + 1) voters and two other candidates a 1 , a 2 / ∈ B. Let n + 1 voters top-rank candidate a 1 and the other n + 1 voters top-rank candidate a 2 . Then candidates a 1 and a 2 make it to the second round.
If we set n > 2q/(k − kq − 2q) then set B is supported by more than qn voters.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let m ≥ 3, and let more than qn voters give candidates from some subset B A (m > |B| = k > 1) top k positions. Then one can find the tight bound for the quota q = q(k, m) using the following equation:
where the left part is the maximal Borda score for any a / ∈ B, and the right part is the minimal possible value for maximal Borda score within the set B.
The example from Table 7 shows that the bound (2m − k − 1)/(2m) is tight.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let qn voters give candidates from some subset B = {b 1 , . . . , b k } top k positions. Then each candidate a / ∈ B gets the following truncated Borda score with t = 2kq:
Let m > 2k and q > (3k − 1)/(4k). It is sufficient to show that for some b ∈ B its truncated Borda score is higher: B 2kq (b)/(2kq) > n/2. For a contradiction assume that the truncated Borda score with t = 2kq satisfies the following inequality:
Then (2kq)n 1 (b) + . . . + (2kq − k + 1)n k (b) 2kq ≤ n 2 for each b ∈ B, whence, after summing up k inequalities, we get:
The latter inequality contradicts the assumption q > (3k − 1)/(4k).
To show that the bound is tight we use the preference profile from Table 7 . Similarly we find a tight bound for the case 2k ≥ m ≥ k + 1: Proof of Theorem 8. Let more than k/(k + 1) of voters give candidates from some subset B top k positions. Then each candidate a / ∈ B gets less than n/(k + 1) votes in pairwise comparison against each candidate from the set B. Upgrading candidate a by one position in the preference profile adds not more than one vote in a pairwise comparison against each candidate from the set B. Therefore candidate a needs more than k( ), Dodgson's rule selects from the set B. The second statement follows from the calculations for the profile in Table 7 .
Proof of Theorem 9.
Let m ≥ 3, and let more than qn voters give candidates from some subset B A (m > |B| = k ≥ 1) top k positions. Then one can find the tight bound for the quota q = q(k, s 1 , . . . , s m ) using the following equation:
where the left part is the maximal total score for any a / ∈ B, and the right part is the minimal maximal total score for any b ∈ B.
The example from Table 7 shows that the bound (5) is tight.
In particular case k = m − 1 and q = 1/2, we get the inequality (6).
Proof of Theorem 11. 1) Fix any k ≥ 1 and any q < 2k/(3k + 1). To show that the properties 2-PD and (q, k)-majority criterion are incompatible we use the profile from Table 7 .
Let m > 2k and the candidates from the set B = {b 1 , . . . , b k } constitute a qualified mutual majority of 2k/(3k + 1) − ε with small ε > 0. Let us show that candidate a 1 / ∈ B positionally dominates each candidate b ∈ B according to the second order positional dominance. It is equivalent to the inequalities B t (a 1 ) ≥ B t (b) for each t = 1, . . . , m − 1, and B m−1 (a 1 ) > B m−1 (b) (see e.g., Stein et al., 1994; Kondratev, 2018) . In our case, it leads to the next obvious inequalities: t 1 − 2k 3k + 1 + ε > t(t + 1) 2k 2k 3k + 1 − ε , 1 ≤ t ≤ k, t 1 − 2k 3k + 1 + ε + (t − k) 2k 3k + 1 − ε > 2t − k + 1 2 2k 3k + 1 − ε , k + 1 ≤ t ≤ m − k, t 1 − 2k 3k + 1 + ε + (t − k) 2k 3k + 1 − ε > 2t − k + 1 2 2k 3k + 1 − ε
2) Let us construct a rule that satisfies 2-PD and (q, k)-majority criterion for each k ≥ 1 and each q ≥ 2k/(3k + 1).
If n 1 (a) > n/2 for some candidate a, then this candidate is the winner. Otherwise, for each candidate a define the next score: (8) max t ∈ [1, ∞] : (3t + 1) 2(t + 1)
and the winner is the candidate with the lowest score. Note that the functions (3t+1)/(2(t+ 1)) and B t (a)/t are non decreasing. Let more than 2k/(3k + 1) of voters give candidates from some subset B = {b 1 , . . . , b k } top k positions. Then we have the next inequality:
hence, for each a / ∈ B, the score (8) is higher than k. It is sufficient to show that for some b ∈ B its score (8) is lower than k. For a contradiction, assume that we have the following inequality:
(3k + 1) 2(k + 1)
Then (3k + 1) 2(k + 1)
whence, after summing up k inequalities and using the fact that b∈B n j (b) > 2kn 3k + 1 for each j = 1, . . . , k,
we receive a contradiction.
